Backend Storage

Reference for implementors of storage backends, encryption layers, consistency checks, and migration/rotation jobs.

The user-facing "how to configure S3" guide lives in docs/config/env.md; the operational plan history is in docs/plan/storage-multi-entry.md and docs/plan/storage-key-rotation.md. This page is the "what the code actually does and why" reference.

Supported backends

Three concrete implementations of BlobStorageBackend ship in the tree today. All go through the same EncryptedBlobBackend wrapper (see §6) so encryption, header format, BLAKE3 rescue, smart-skip probe, and lifecycle behaviour are uniform.

Backend	`StorageBackendType`	Env key prefix	Config surface	Impl
Local filesystem	`Local`	`OXICLOUD_STORAGE_<name>_ROOT_DIR`	Root directory on the host FS. Shard tree `<root>/.blobs/<xx>/`. Atomic replace via tempfile + `rename(2)`.	`local_blob_backend.rs`
S3-compatible	`S3`	`OXICLOUD_STORAGE_<name>_BUCKET` + `_REGION` + `_ACCESS_KEY` + `_SECRET_KEY` + optional `_ENDPOINT_URL` + `_FORCE_PATH_STYLE`	AWS S3, Cloudflare R2, Backblaze B2, MinIO, DigitalOcean Spaces, Wasabi — anything speaking the S3 API.	`s3_blob_backend.rs`
Azure Blob Storage	`Azure`	`OXICLOUD_STORAGE_<name>_ACCOUNT_NAME` + `_ACCOUNT_KEY` (or `_SAS_TOKEN`) + `_CONTAINER` + optional `_ENDPOINT_URL`	Azure Blob Storage; `_ENDPOINT_URL` targets Azurite (local emulator) or private endpoints.	`azure_blob_backend.rs`

Every entry is declared in OXICLOUD_STORAGE_ENTRIES (comma-separated list of names). The active entry is stored in admin_settings and switched via oxicloud storage select <name> on the command line or automatically at the end of a successful backend_migration. Non-active entries stay reachable through the multi-entry API (test, audit, migrate-into).

Adding a new backend = new struct implementing BlobStorageBackend

a new arm on StorageBackendType + a new branch in entry_backend::build_base_backend. The wrapper stack, key rotation, consistency check, and migration all pick it up for free (see §6).

1. The `file → blob → chunk` model

Three separate concerns, three separate storage layers:

text

                     PostgreSQL                                  Backend
                                                              (Local/S3/Azure)
 ┌─────────────────────┐     ┌──────────────────────┐         ┌──────────────┐
 │ storage.files       │     │ storage.blobs        │         │              │
 │ - id                │────▶│ - hash (BLAKE3)      │────────▶│ .blobs/xx/   │
 │ - name              │     │ - size, ref_count    │         │   <hash>.blob│
 │ - folder_id         │     │ - content_type       │         │              │
 │ - blob_hash         │     │                      │         │              │
 └─────────────────────┘     └──────────────────────┘         └──────────────┘
                                     ▲
                                     │ (for chunked files only)
                             ┌───────┴──────────────┐
                             │ storage.chunk_manifests
                             │ - file_hash          │
                             │ - chunk_hashes[]     │
                             │ - total_size         │
                             └──────────────────────┘

File (storage.files) — DB row. Has a name, a folder, a drive, an owner, a size, a MIME type. Points at exactly one content descriptor: either a whole-file blob or a chunk manifest, both keyed by BLAKE3 hash. Files are what users see; nothing about them lives on the backend.

Blob (storage.blobs) — DB row + physical bytes on a backend. Content-addressable: the row's primary key is hash = BLAKE3(plaintext_bytes). ref_count is the number of live references (files or manifests) pointing at this blob; when it reaches zero, dedup_gc removes both the row and the physical bytes (after a grace window). Every backend lays blobs out under a two-char shard directory: .blobs/<first-two-hex>/<full-hash>.blob — Local's filesystem tree, S3's object keys, Azure's blob names. See LocalBlobBackend::object_key and its S3/Azure counterparts.

Chunk (storage.chunk_manifests) — content-defined-chunking (CDC) subdivision of a file. When an upload exceeds the whole-file threshold, the ingest pipeline splits it into ≤1 MiB chunks and stores each as its own blob. The manifest records the chunk sequence + total size; downloads stream through the manifest, fetching each chunk blob in order. Chunk blobs are indistinguishable from whole-file blobs at the backend layer — they're just blobs. storage.chunk_manifests is pure PG state with no backend bytes.

Why this matters for backend implementors: you only ever deal with blobs. You never see file paths, folder trees, chunks, manifests, or users. Your API is (hash) → put/get/exists/delete bytes. Everything else is orchestrated above.

2. The v1 blob header (`OXCPT`)

Every blob written since the key-rotation implementation landed starts with a 15-byte header:

text

byte 0..4    "OXCPT"        magic marker (5 bytes)
byte 5..6    0x00 0x01      format version (2 bytes, big-endian u16)
byte 7..14   <key_fp>       key fingerprint (8 bytes)

Then either:

plaintext-v1: key_fp is all zeros; the header is followed by raw plaintext bytes.
encrypted-v1: key_fp is SHA-256(key_material)[..8]; the header is followed by a 12-byte AES-GCM nonce, then the ciphertext, then the 16-byte GCM tag. Total overhead: 43 bytes.

Rendered visually via xxd -l 15 <blob>:

text

4f58 4350 54 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00     OXCPT..........       ← plaintext-v1
4f58 4350 54 00 01 15 f3 8f 80 2c ae 2c 50     OXCPT......,.,P       ← encrypted-v1 with key_fp = 15:f3:8f:80:2c:ae:2c:50

Fingerprints are rendered the same colon-hex form (15:f3:…:50) everywhere they appear: boot log, admin panel pair chain, xxd inspection, oxicloud storage fingerprint <base64> CLI, and the rotate / migration audit lines. That means an admin can cross-reference by eye — same string means same key.

Why the header exists

Before the key-rotation implementation, blobs had no header. Reading a legacy blob meant "try to decrypt with the currently-configured key; if it works, it's encrypted; if not, it's plaintext." This has three problems:

Ambiguity on key change. If the operator changed the key, every existing blob became unreadable — nothing on disk said which key was used.
No way to smart-skip. A rotation or migration couldn't tell whether a target blob was already in the desired state without reading and re-hashing every byte.
No forward compatibility. Any future format change (E2E, compression, alternate cipher) would need magic-byte detection layered on top.

The header solves all three. Magic bytes disambiguate legacy from v1. Version bytes let us evolve the format. key_fp lets us identify which key was used without trying every candidate.

Future: end-to-end encryption

The current EncryptedV1 variant is server-side encryption at rest — the server holds the key. E2E encryption (client holds the key, server sees only ciphertext) is designed to slot in as a new version:

text

byte 5..6    0x00 0x02      format version = 2 (E2E)
byte 7..14   <key_fp>       hint identifying the client key
byte 15..    <opaque body>  client-encrypted payload, opaque to server

The read/write pipeline stays the same at the backend layer — the server just passes bytes through. read_dispatch grows a match arm for version 2 that skips server decryption entirely. This is why the version bytes exist as a distinct field: the file format is extensible without a magic-byte rewrite.

BLAKE3 rescue for legacy plaintext

Deployments that predate the key-rotation implementation have blobs on disk with no OXCPT header — the pipeline calls these Legacy format. Reads try to decrypt with each pair-list key; if all fail, a last-resort branch computes BLAKE3(raw_bytes) and returns the bytes as plaintext iff the digest matches the expected hash. Zero-false-positive by construction (content-addressable proof). Emits encryption.legacy_plaintext_rescued audit lines so operators can spot which blobs still need re-writing. See encrypted_blob_backend.rs::read_dispatch last branch.

The rescue is transparent — downloads, thumbnails, consistency checks, and rotation all benefit. The first time backend_rotate sweeps a legacy-plaintext blob, it classifies it as Legacy, rewrites it through the wrapper, and the resulting blob has a proper v1 header. After one rotate pass, rescue never fires again.

3. Key rotation

Pair-list config

Encryption is configured per storage entry via a comma-separated pair list:

bash

OXICLOUD_STORAGE_<name>_ENCRYPTION_KEY='aes_gcm:<b64_key1>,aes_gcm:<b64_key2>,none:'

The head is the leftmost entry — writes use this key. Every entry in the list is available for reads (fallback loop). none: in the list declares "raw plaintext is a legitimate on-disk shape for this backend" — the leftmost none: becomes the head if placed first, otherwise it enables the plaintext-fallback branch of read_dispatch.

Rotate job (`backend_rotate`)

Recoverable job that iterates every blob on the current backend and rewrites any whose header doesn't match the current head format. Decision table via BlobFormat::classify compared against EncryptedBlobBackend::head_format:

Current on-disk	Head	Action
`EncryptedV1 { key_fp: A }`	`EncryptedV1 { key_fp: A }`	skip
`EncryptedV1 { key_fp: A }`	`EncryptedV1 { key_fp: B }`	rewrite (key change)
`PlaintextV1`	`EncryptedV1 { key_fp: X }`	rewrite (encrypt in place)
`EncryptedV1`	`PlaintextV1`	rewrite (decrypt in place)
`Legacy`	anything v1	rewrite (upgrade header)

Reports per-blob outcomes (rewritten, skipped, failed) and the final head format/fp in the run's extra_stats. Each rewrite goes through put_blob_from_bytes_replace — see §6.

Head-key vs fallback keys

Head — used for writes only. Rotating just means "declare a new head and run backend_rotate to catch up existing bytes."
Fallback keys — read-only. Kept in the pair list until every blob on disk has been rewritten under the head, then safe to remove from .env.

The admin panel shows the whole pair chain per entry with the head badged; after a successful rotation with failed=0, non-head keys can be safely dropped.

4. Blob consistency — two jobs, split by what they read

The registry side and the physical side are separate tenants. They used to be one, with blobs_consistency probing the backend once per row; that probe found strictly less than the merge-join below, at N round-trips instead of one enumeration, so it was removed.

`blobs_consistency` — database only

Walks storage.blobs and compares ref_count against the reference count computed from storage.files.blob_hash + chunk_manifests.chunk_hashes[]. On mismatch: refcount_mismatch (severity inconsistent), repairable under ?repair=true.

It opens no backend and makes no network call. ?storage=<name> and ?deep=true are inert. Cost is one aggregate SQL per row.

`backend_consistency` — everything physical

Merge-joins the backend's enumeration against storage.blobs, both ordered by hash, yielding both deltas in one pass:

bytes with no registry row → orphan_blob (severity inconsistent)
a registry row with no bytes → blob_missing_from_backend (severity data_loss)

?storage=<name> scopes it to any declared entry rather than the live backend.

Deep mode (`?deep=true`, on `backend_consistency`)

For every hash present on both sides, adds a full read:

Stream the blob through EncryptedBlobBackend::get_blob_stream (strips header, decrypts if needed, applies BLAKE3 rescue for legacy plaintext)
Recompute BLAKE3(plaintext) and compare against the row's hash
If bytes match: no finding
If bytes differ: record blob_corrupted (silent bit-rot)
If the read pipeline errors (missing key, unreadable header, network failure): record blob_unreadable

Both blob_corrupted and blob_unreadable carry the list of files that reference the offending hash (affected_files) so the operator can decide whether to re-upload or drop.

The deep flag is persisted in the run's params on Fresh open so it survives a mid-run restart — resume continues in deep mode without the operator re-specifying it.

5. Backend migration (`backend_migration`)

Recoverable job that copies every blob from the current active backend to a target entry, then hot-swaps the active pointer on completion.

Cursor + resume

Iterates blobs in ascending hash order. Checkpoints the last-visited hash to jobs.recoverable_runs.cursor after each batch. On restart, WHERE hash > cursor picks up from where the previous session stopped. MigrationProgress counter is seeded from stats.scanned_count on resume so the maintenance banner shows continued progress, not a fresh 0.

Smart-skip via `head_check`

Before each copy, target.head_check(hash) returns one of:

Match → target blob already carries the current head's format+key_fp; skip. Debug-log backend_migration.blob_skipped_head_match.
Mismatch(current_format) → target blob exists with a different header (legacy shape, old key, plaintext vs encrypted). Overwrite via put_blob_from_bytes_replace. Info-log backend_migration.blob_overwritten — this is the legacy skip-check residual repair log line: exactly the blobs that historically escaped re-encryption because the pre-rotation migration path had an if target exists { skip } short-circuit (see §5 below).
Absent → fresh write. Info-log backend_migration.blob_written.

The check is one 15-byte range-read via get_blob_range_stream(hash, 0, Some(15)) on the inner backend — cheap on Local (pread), cheap on S3/Azure (single GET with Range: bytes=0-14).

Legacy skip-check residual repair (the historic bug)

Before the key-rotation implementation, the migration path hit if target.blob_exists(hash) { continue } before every copy — it silently skipped blobs already present on the target, even if the target's current head key was different from the key used at the historical write time. Result: mixed-key target backends, and blobs that suddenly failed to read when the old key was later removed from the pair list.

The rotation work removed the app-layer skip. Backend-agnostic write-side fixes followed: every backend's put_blob_from_bytes_replace was overridden to bypass the internal HEAD-probe skip (S3BlobBackend, AzureBlobBackend) or use O_CREAT|O_TRUNC via tempfile+rename (LocalBlobBackend). See §6 for the full contract.

Failure gate

finish_completed refuses to flip the active-backend pointer if failed > 0. Emits storage_migration.aborted audit, clears readonly (source stays active — writes safe there), and returns RunOutcome::Failed. Operator inspects findings, then either retries (walk short-circuits on head-format matches → cheap re-attempt), fixes the source, or explicitly accepts the partial via oxicloud storage select <target>.

6. Implementor contract — the `BlobStorageBackend` trait

Always wrapped in `EncryptedBlobBackend`

Every entry is built via entry_backend::build_entry_backend_typed, which unconditionally wraps the raw backend in EncryptedBlobBackend — regardless of whether the entry has an encryption key. A none: head gets an EncryptedBlobBackend with head_cipher = None that writes plaintext-v1 blobs. This means:

Every read goes through read_dispatch → magic-byte inspection → v1 or legacy branch → decrypt (if needed) → BLAKE3 rescue (if legacy plaintext).
Every write goes through the wrapper's write path → prepend the 15-byte header → encrypt with head cipher (or leave plaintext) → hand to inner backend.
The inner backend never sees plaintext application content — only the header-wrapped or encrypted body.

Your job as a backend implementor: implement BlobStorageBackend for opaque byte payloads. Never inspect or modify the bytes.

Required overrides

The trait provides defaults but they lie about correctness for the rotate/migrate use case. Every production backend MUST override put_blob_from_bytes_replace.

Method	Semantics	Default	Must override?
`put_blob`	Content-addressed upload. May skip if hash exists (dedup, idempotency).	—	yes
`put_blob_from_bytes`	Same, in-memory bytes. May skip if exists.	—	yes
`put_blob_from_bytes_unsynced`	Unconditional PUT. Durability not required on return; caller batches `sync_blobs`.	delegates to `put_blob_from_bytes` (WRONG for skip-backends)	recommended (dedup fast-path)
`put_blob_from_bytes_replace`	Unconditional overwrite. Durable on return. Used by rotate + migration.	delegates to `put_blob_from_bytes` (WRONG for every current backend)	yes
`get_blob_stream`	Full-blob stream.	—	yes
`get_blob_range_stream`	Range stream — used by the 15-byte `head_check` probe.	—	yes
`blob_exists`	Cheap presence check.	—	yes
`delete_blob`	Physical deletion.	—	yes
`sync_blobs`	Fsync barrier for `_unsynced` writes.	no-op	Local only
`initialize`	Called at boot. Verify creds, create shard dirs, reap tempfiles.	no-op	yes

The put_blob* skip-if-exists semantics is correct for uploads — dedup hits should short-circuit. It's wrong for rewrites — rotate needs to overwrite the header, migration needs to overwrite with new-key ciphertext. put_blob_from_bytes_replace is the escape hatch. On S3/Azure it delegates to put_blob_from_bytes_unsynced (unconditional PUT, durable on return). On Local it does write-to-tempfile + rename(2) + fsync — atomic overwrite on POSIX.

Reference implementations

LocalBlobBackend — filesystem tree under a configurable root. Shard directory .blobs/<xx>/. Tempfiles named <hash>.replace.<pid>.<counter>.tmp, reaped at boot by initialize.
S3BlobBackend — AWS SDK v2. Object key <xx>/<hash>.blob under a configurable bucket. put_blob_from_bytes_replace delegates to put_blob_from_bytes_unsynced (skips the HEAD probe).
AzureBlobBackend — Azure SDK. Same shape as S3.

Read them side-by-side before implementing a new backend — the three follow the same skeleton so the diff is where your backend's semantics genuinely differ.

File and blob lifecycle → — the hook system that observes file/blob CRUD events.
Background jobs → — how to plug in a new job tenant.
Storage quotas → — usage accounting layer (independent of the backend).
Storage multi-entry plan → — design history: why multiple entries, why hot-swap migration.
Storage key rotation plan → — design history and slice-by-slice implementation notes.

Backend Storage ​

Supported backends ​

1. The file → blob → chunk model ​

2. The v1 blob header (OXCPT) ​

Why the header exists ​

Future: end-to-end encryption ​

BLAKE3 rescue for legacy plaintext ​

3. Key rotation ​

Pair-list config ​

Rotate job (backend_rotate) ​

Head-key vs fallback keys ​

4. Blob consistency — two jobs, split by what they read ​

blobs_consistency — database only ​

backend_consistency — everything physical ​

Deep mode (?deep=true, on backend_consistency) ​

5. Backend migration (backend_migration) ​

Cursor + resume ​

Smart-skip via head_check ​

Legacy skip-check residual repair (the historic bug) ​

Failure gate ​

6. Implementor contract — the BlobStorageBackend trait ​

Always wrapped in EncryptedBlobBackend ​

Required overrides ​

Reference implementations ​

Related docs ​

Backend Storage

Supported backends

1. The `file → blob → chunk` model

2. The v1 blob header (`OXCPT`)

Why the header exists

Future: end-to-end encryption

BLAKE3 rescue for legacy plaintext

3. Key rotation

Pair-list config

Rotate job (`backend_rotate`)

Head-key vs fallback keys

4. Blob consistency — two jobs, split by what they read

`blobs_consistency` — database only

`backend_consistency` — everything physical

Deep mode (`?deep=true`, on `backend_consistency`)

5. Backend migration (`backend_migration`)

Cursor + resume

Smart-skip via `head_check`

Legacy skip-check residual repair (the historic bug)

Failure gate

6. Implementor contract — the `BlobStorageBackend` trait

Always wrapped in `EncryptedBlobBackend`

Required overrides

Reference implementations

Related docs